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ETHNO-NATIONALIST WELTANSCHAUUNG 
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Despite the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina have been going through a deep and thorough Europeanisation 
process since the late 1990s it is interesting and puzzling as well that the country still has not achieved the ex-
pected level of democratic consolidation. Especially, it is of utmost importance to pay attention the increasing 
political domination of ethnic-nationalist political forces in the post-war Bosnia which tend to institutionally 
marginalize citizens of the minority groups and those who declare themselves as non-nationalists. Such a dis-
criminatory process clearly opposes the country’s aspirations towards European Union membership. Thus, in 
this article I investigate the process of the post-war ethno-nationalist paradigm which has brought about deep 
discrimination against the so-called Others as they are de¿  ned in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The article comes with the conclusion that post-war Bosnian democracy has included a number of institutional 
shortcomings and serious de¿  ciencies thus resulting in an ethnocratic regime which excludes everyone who 
does not feel part of such a regime. Thus, the current process of an ethno-nationalisation has clearly blocked 
further progress of the country towards the future European Union membership. 
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1.  THE DOMINATION OF ETHNO-NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTIES
In the aftermath of a widespread democratization processes in Eastern and Central Eu-
rope, in November 1990 the ¿  rst multi-party elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina (hereinafter, Bosnia or BiH). These elections were among the ¿  rst signs which marked 
the democratic transition of the country from the communist regime to liberal democracy. 
However, political parties in the country were allowed to be organized along ethnic lines 
resulting in the nationalist parties together collecting 84% of the vote (Arnautoviü 2007: 7). 
Thus, an organization of the ¿  rst democratic elections in the country marked the start of 
the political hegemony of nationalist political parties as majority of the electorate voted for 
nationalist parties, that is, Bosnians voted for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Bos-
nian Serbs for the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and Bosnian Croats for the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) (Freedom House 2010: 122). Furthermore, even the post-election 
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distribution of power was based upon ethnic principles so that the President of the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Bosnian, the of the Parliament was a Serb, while the 
prime minister was a Croat representative. What is more, the war that broke out in 1992 
further increased ethnic hatreds and mutual intolerance resulting in ethnicity and ethnic 
solidarity as a dominant social and political cleavage. Thus, political competition for votes 
has been based mainly on nationalist rhetoric, and the so-called politics of outbidding has 
continuously taken place in post-war BiH as nationalist parties have cemented their early 
seize of power in successive elections (Jarstad 2006: 16). 
Thus, the conÀ  ict between the three ethnic groups intensi¿  ed inter-ethnic polarization 
and massively strengthened the political domination of ethno-nationalist political parties 
in the decision-making processes. What is more, the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed in 
1995 and brought the war to the end, not only created an extremely cumbersome policy 
process that would frequently result in deadlock, it also left unresolved the conÀ  icts that 
had come to the fore in the 1992–1995 war and enshrined the ethno-nationalist principle as 
the foundation of public discourse (Vogel 2006: 2). While the DPA brought the war to an 
end and laid the foundation for consolidating peace, many observers also believe that the 
agreement as a document that reÀ  ects wartime circumstances cannot by itself ensure BiH’s 
future as a functioning and democratic state (Ashdown 2005). As Kurt Bassuener points 
out, the Dayton constitution makes leveraging fear politically pro¿  table and politicians 
unaccountable. Bosnian politicians pursue their self-aggrandizing, maximalist goals at the 
expense of the general welfare (Bassuener 2009: 1). Thus, the post-war political and social 
space has been largely been dominated by three ethnic groups leading to institutional mar-
ginalization of minority groups and each citizen who does not identify with the dominant 
ethnic communities. In addition, the goal of the nationalistic philosophies in Bosnia is not 
to initiate some kind of physical conÀ  ict. Their goal is to maintain a certain level of frustra-
tion among ordinary citizens and thereby to maintain a logic of exclusiveness and distrust 
toward the other ethnic groups and in such a way to extend their rule (Kukic 2005: 15). 
In post-Dayton Bosnia the majority of citizens are in a position of homo duplex or 
a divided human since their in a struggle between being a genuine human being and loyal 
ethnic being. While transition to democracy should bring about participation and inclusion 
of diverse groups into public policy-making the post-war Bosnian public sphere has been 
increasingly dominated by an ethno-political matrix causing discrimination against each 
citizen in the country who does not declare himself as a member of the three biggest ethnic 
groups. As Fareed Zakaria claims: 
In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it 
hypernationalism and war-mongering. When the political system is opened up, diverse groups with 
incompatible interests gain access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders, 
who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize that to succeed they must 
rally the masses behind a national cause. The result is invariably aggressive rhetoric and policies, 
which often drag countries into confrontation and war (Zakaria 2003: 114). 
Keeping in mind that the process of ethnic-nationalist political paradigm has become 
central social and political parameter in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina it is puz-
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zling to understand how such a discriminatory political model has inÀ  uenced the country’s 
aspirations of European Union membership. Thus, this research explores just that and is 
based around the fundamental question of the extent the ethno-nationalist political Welt-
anschauung has slowed down the European integration-related reforms in post-war Bosnia 
and Herzegovina? 
2. BALKANISATION  VERSUS  EUROPEANIZATION 
In addition, such a discriminatory political system is in clear conÀ  ict with the country’s 
efforts to enter the European Union in the foreseeable future. In fact, in the end of 1990s 
through the newly initiated Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) the European 
Union has aimed to encourage the path of the region’s states, including BiH, integration 
into the political and economic structures of the Bloc (Becker 2008: 20). Thus, the SAP 
became the centerpiece of the EU’s long-term strategy towards the region of Western Bal-
kans. Additionally, in June 2000 in the Feira European Council it was decided that all the 
SAP countries, including Bosnia, are potential candidates for EU membership. Following 
a dif¿  cult reform process Bosnia and Herzegovina has signed the Stabilization and Associa-
tion Agreements (SAA) with the EU in June 2008 which was the ¿  rst pre-accession tool for 
this Balkan country towards its eventual EU membership. The previous EU enlargement 
commissioner Olli Rehn called the SAA a milestone that marks a new stage in our rela-
tions and a gateway for [EU] candidacy (Vucheva 2008). Thus, for BiH and for the whole 
of the Western Balkans, the EU-related reform process means adjustment to advanced 
western models as well as security and prosperity for the future (Anastasakis 2005: 80). In 
other words, the so-called Europeanization process has inÀ  uenced the political, economic, 
administrative, and social policy-making in the country. 
Thus, Kubicek (Kubicek 2005: 374) claims that the process of Europeanization not 
only guarantees new opportunities for societal forces that had been previously excluded 
from policy-making but also it contributes to the transformation of other structural elements 
such as a political ideology (identity politics), a legal framework, and a party system, and 
triggers changes in them all, ¿  nally resulting in internal reforms. Furthermore, Ladrech 
(Ladrech 1994) mentions the transformative power of the Europeanization process put-
ting emphasis on citizenship and national identity. However, it is highly debatable to what 
extent the Europeanization process in Bosnia has inÀ  uenced the idea of citizenship since 
minority groups and non-national members are widely marginalized both at the state and 
societal level. Although there have been a number of dif¿  cult problems slowing down 
Bosnia’s EU reform process, widespread ethnic polarization and omnipresent ethnic domi-
nation over the public sphere have become the most staggering challenges to the country’s 
route to Brussels. That is, the current Bosnian ethno-political arrangement has limited 
realization of citizens’ individual identity that should be an essential part of the European-
ization process. Post-war Bosnia has mostly been closer to the process of ‘Balkanization’ 
that is viewed as contrary to what may be ‘western’ values and norms (Todorova 1994).
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3.  THE EUROPE UNION’S NON-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE 
What is more, one of the main objectives of establishing the European Community, 
later called the European Union, was to reduce disintegrative and harmful inÀ  uences of 
nationalists and thus integrate the European countries into a peaceful, prosperous, and se-
cure community. That is, a peaceful and harmonious coexistence between different national, 
linguistic, religious, sexual, and racial groups have been encouraged in the EU institutional 
framework (Zo¿  a Wilk-Woœ 2010: 79). In particular, at the outset of the 1990s the EU inten-
si¿  ed its activities in the ¿  eld of minority protection prior to the enlargement of the Central 
and Eastern European countries. Thus, in June 1993 the European Council held in Copenha-
gen agreed on the so-called Copenhagen Criteria that, among other things, emphasizes the 
protection of minority groups. That is, the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria require candi-
date countries to achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, hu-
man rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Harryvan, van der Harst 1997: 285). 
This being said, the applicant countries are supposed to implement necessary reforms and 
pass laws that will effectively protect members of minority groups.
Thus, the Copenhagen Criteria has considerably contributed to the extension of indi-
vidual rights because it cemented the agreement that “persons belonging to national mi-
norities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other 
members of their group” (OSCE 1990). Additionally, Article 12 of the TEC had prohibited 
discrimination based on national identity. Following the Amsterdam Treaty, the Article 13 
of the TEC forbids discriminatory acts on the basis of eight following grounds, namely, 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Most 
importantly, in the Treaty of Lisbon the minority groups were legally recognized in the 
text of EU primary law (FRA 2010: 46). Thus, in the Article 1a it was stated that the rights 
of persons belonging to minority groups have become the central values and principles 
that the EU protects. Furthermore, the EU Fundamental Rights Charter paves the way to 
the principle of the non-discrimination and encourages member states to protect religious, 
cultural, and linguistic diversity (Vouters 2001). This brought the EU much closer to its 
visionary ideal of “Unity in diversity”. 
4.  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS
On the other hand, contemporary Bosnian public life has been marked by extensive ex-
clusive political modus vivendi based one extreme violation of fundamental human rights 
marginalizing citizens that do not sympathize with nationalist political projects. Thus, the 
post-Dayton political model has been concerned with the extent and nature of political 
participation of the citizens belonging to the three largest nations in the country. In order to 
thoroughly comprehend and analyze the process of political participation of the citizens in 
the country Jurgen Habermas’s notion of citizen recognition provides an adequate theoreti-
cal framework as a basis for constructive debate. For instance, Habermas examines cases 
where the cultural or national identity of citizens prevents their political participation in 
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the public sphere with the rest of society denying them basic human rights. According to 
Habermas, the public spaces characterized by serious violations of basic human rights by 
other citizens there exists “an incomplete or unequal inclusion of citizens, to whom full 
status as members of the political community is denied” (Habermas 2005: 16). Simply put, 
Habermas supports the thought that democracy is only possible with widespread presence 
of inclusive participation in a society. Also, in the view of discursive theorists it is impor-
tant to maintain not just maximal inclusion but also equality of effectiveness in the exercise 
of communicative freedom among all the citizens who participate in the democratic process 
(Knight, Johnson 1995: 302). To be sure, Habermas also admits that “collective rights are 
not suspicious per se” (Habermas 2005: 19). Similarly, Taylor has argued that possible 
clashes between individual and collective rights are resolved by supporting the inherent 
values in cultures that respect the idea of fundamental rights (Taylor 1994).
That is why, Habermas has strongly defended democratic principles such as popular 
sovereignty, rule of law, constitutionally guaranteed rights, and civil liberties as an in-
dispensable component of the open and democratic regime. Therefore, Habermas argues 
that constitutions are the basis for creating a peaceful and democratic society in a hetero-
geneous contexts. In this regard, he also points out that it is the constitutional principles 
based on a rule of law that unite and integrate the citizens of a society in which there is 
a wealth of social, cultural, national, philosophical values, and ideas (Habermas 2003). That 
is, inclusive constitution is the basis of democratic order in every free and open society. 
As O’Neill points out: “no citizen, or group of citizens, should be excluded from a demo-
cratic process of legitimation. Relevant interests and needs, values and aspirations, convic-
tions, and conceptions of identity, must somehow all be factored into our law-making pro-
cedures” (O’Neill 2000: 1). Therefore, societies perceiving themselves as democratic can 
not set up their political order on exclusionary or discriminatory constitutional principles or 
a marginalizing social mindset. In the context of Bosnia where there are the three dominant 
ethnic groups and several minority groups it is of utmost importance to design a political 
system which will be able to accommodate all these existing diversities. As Marshall and 
Gurr point out it is critical to “provide some combination of political recognition, greater 
rights and regional autonomy to the populations represented by [separatist] movements” 
(Marshall, Gurr 2003: 26).
5.  ETHNO-NATIONALIST RATIONALE OF THE DAYTON AGREEMENT 
Although more than ¿  fteen years since the Dayton Agreement was signed political 
tensions are still omnipresent across Bosnian society and national leaders are challenging 
the Peace Accord more openly and more harshly than ever before. That is, in post-Dayton 
Bosnia an exclusive ethno-nationalist approach to politics has managed to gain the upper 
hand over reconciliation and consensus (Bianchini 2000: 79). Better to say, the Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a constitution of the Peace Agreement, not of a democratic 
country. It is an attempt to provide an internal framework to the administrative, territorial 
division of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to construct an institutional structure based 
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on ethnic principles. Founded on ethnic representation, this constitution prefers by virtue 
of its inner logic political parties of the same, ethnic principle. These parties form a ruling 
coalition that has been unable to set up effective institutions; in fact, the lack of functioning 
of institutions is a natural way the government of these parties function (Papic 2005: 34). 
Thus, BiH is still far from a functioning and democratic state that the accord had envi-
sioned. Today, the country still consists of de facto three mono-ethnic territories, three 
education systems, and a national government where ethnic key is the rule of the game. In 
fact, the whole state structure is built according to an omnipresent ethno-nationalist model. 
Therefore, the three majority ethnic groups dominate the public discourse in every aspect 
of life, excluding minorities and non-nationalists. The best example is the Bosnian rotating 
presidency consisting of three members: one Bosnian, one Croat, and one Serb, each of 
whom must be directly elected in their respective entity. That is, the Bosnian constitution 
treats non-ethnic members of its community as aliens or apostates.
In other words, as stated in the Dayton Agreement the Constitution of BiH prevents can-
didacy of “others”, which are minority groups, to the Presidency and the House of Peoples 
on the ground of their ethnic origins because these positions are guaranteed for the so-called 
‘constituent’ peoples, i.e. Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats. However, from an historical and legal 
point of view, such an aspect of constituency is impossible to explain. Its background is de-
¿  nitively politically motivated (Imamovic 1998: 114). The term ‘constituent people’ is used 
to mean a nation, a particular national identity, and not to mean the people (populus) as the 
sum of individuals, citizens of a state... This term is used in the case of multinational politi-
cal communities or states without a clear majority. In conditions of a mixture of nations, 
the relation between a constituent people as a collective and an individual member of that 
collectivity is personal and not territorial (Trnka 2000: 49). However, Trnka’s explanation 
of why there is this ‘constitutional category’ at all is paradoxical:
The establishment and realization of speci¿  c rights of constituent peoples is justi¿  ed until the eco-
nomic, social, political, cultural, and other conditions for realization of international standards of 
human rights and freedoms are established, that is until local and international protection mechanisms 
of these rights and freedoms are established. Therefore, this is a transitory solution until society and 
state without discrimination among the peoples on the ground is established (Trnka: 2000: 57). 
In addition, “the ethnic principle generally determines the constitutional procedures 
and functioning of the central government of the Dayton Constitution” (Sarcevic 1997: 53). 
Thus, ethnic groups are represented as communities in different power-sharing levels in-
stitutionalizing ethnic nationalism as a dominant political objective. The hegemony of 
ethno-politicians has been perpetuated by the vague and manipulative idea of “constituent 
peoples”. As a result, minority groups and non-ethnic members of Bosnian society are 
completely excluded from the current power-sharing model. It is a kind of heresy to declare 
yourself non-ethnic or a sympathizing minority identity. As Touquet and Vermeersch argue: 
These people have now been excluded from mainstream accounts of the outcomes of the recent 
conÀ  ict: it is not possible to be a Yugoslav, a Bosnian or an Eskimo in a situation in which ethnic 
nationalism has transcended all else and in which there are intensely localized variations in identity 
and ‘national’ sentiments (Touquet and Varmeersch 2008: 280).
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6.  POLITICAL COMPETITION BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS 
In addition, a number of scholars regularly point out that DPA was negotiated by the 
nationalist actors, who actually were one of the main causes of the war, and thus it just 
extended the power of the ethic-nationalist parties and their leaders (Kaldor 1997: 28–30). 
Bosnian citizens that do not belong to the so-called “constituent peoples” were forgotten 
during the negotiations in Dayton and later completely excluded from the institutional 
framework. Thus, the so-called “Others” in the Bosnian constitution, namely Jews, Roma 
and all others who do not declare af¿  liation with the three ethnic groups have become 
citizens without institutional space to exercise their political and social rights. Given such 
unlawful provisions of the Bosnian constitution the country has faced a deep institutional 
and constitutional crisis which openly threatens the idea of democratic participation. As 
post-war Bosnia was designated to become an “ethnic state” in the eyes of ethno-nationalist 
leaders the national minorities as an argument of genuine multi-national Bosnia have been 
marginalized from public space. Thus, such a legal and political basis imposes the “perme-
ation of national identity at all institutional levels” and produces a massive “ethnicization 
of the political system” (Bieber 2004: 84). 
Thus, through extensive institutionalization of ethno-nationalization Bosnia has become 
a place where only citizens declaring themselves to be nationalist have a right to take part in 
the country’s policy-making processes. In fact, the category of “others” and non-nationalists 
are openly perceived as a threat to the power-sharing model of rotation where three ethnic 
groups chose their representatives, respectively. The “rotation model” is a clear mechanism 
of political engineering in order to achieve the objective of an ethnically-divided Bosnia. 
Thus, democratic participation in the country is a competition between ethnicities or ethnic 
communities rather than a race of equal personalities having the right to vote. As a result, 
the post-war hegemony of ethno-nationalists has paradoxically resulted in increasing the 
democratic de¿  cit of the country. Consequently, all those that belong to the category of 
“Others” who number 17 in BiH, namely, Albanians, Montenegrins, Czechs, Italians, Jews, 
Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Polls, the Roma, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, 
Slovaks, Slovenians, Turks, and Ukrainians (Hammarberg 2010: 6) are just playing a role of 
mere spectators during democratic elections. As a result, the “Others” and non-nationalists 
among the Bosnian population have become “strangers in their own country”.
7.  SYSTEMIC MARGINALIZATION OF THE MINORITY GROUPS 
The Dayton Agreement resulted in a power-sharing structure dividing Bosnia into two 
“ethnic” entities, the Bosnian Serb-populated Republika Srpska, and Bosnians and the 
Croat-populated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, at the state level there 
is a rotating presidency consisting of three ethnic representatives respectively, and a state 
parliament which are superior to the entity institutional structures. Nevertheless, as stated in 
the Dayton Agreement the Constitution of BiH prevents the candidacy of “Others”, which 
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are minority groups, to the Presidency and the House of Peoples on the ground of their 
ethnic origins because these positions are guaranteed for the so-called ‘constituent’ peoples, 
i.e. Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats. This includes national minorities who have lived in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for centuries” (Claridge 2010: 1). This power-sharing arrangement has 
considerably contributed to the process of ethno-nationalization since non-ethnic elements 
are completely excluded from political participation in the country where they were born. 
Although BiH joined the Council of Europe on 24 April 2002 there has been increasing 
discrimination against minorities in the country. 
Thus, the Constitution of BiH institutionalizes some new type of ethnic democracy 
that challenges the values of the European Enlightenment, of the individual as an abstract 
citizen (Sarcevic 1997: 55). By forbidding minority members the right to run for of¿  ce the 
Bosnian constitution violates fundamental human rights though in 2002 its government rati-
¿  ed the ECHR and its Protocols. Thus, Jakob Finci and Dervo Sejdiü who are respectively 
Jewish and Roma by their ethnicity, contested these provisions before the ECHR since they 
were banned from running for of¿  ce. On December 2009 the Court ruled that the exclusion of 
minority groups from Bosnia’s highest elected of¿  ces constituted unjusti¿  ed discrimination. 
Thus, “the European Court has made it clear that race-based exclusion from political of¿  ce 
has no place in Europe,” said Clive Baldwin, senior legal advisor at HRW (Guardian 2009). 
If correctly implemented, the decision of the ECHR will assist in breaking down ethnic and 
religious divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina by encouraging political participation and 
representation, and promoting social cohesion. (Claridge 2010: 2). However, two years have 
passed since the Court decision and the country’s politicians have not yet removed discrimi-
natory provisions from the constitution due to their different ethnic interests. As a result, 
Bosnia is still profoundly an undemocratic country. While most of Europe is going towards 
multi-national structures Bosnia is still pushing ethno-nationalization. 
8. PREJUDICES  AND  DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST THE ROMA POPULATION 
 For instance, the Roma problem in the country is the most illustrative case. Although 
in 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Action Plan to Address the Problems of Roma 
in Employment, Housing and Healthcare, this minority group is still highly marginalized. 
Similarly, both in pre-war and the post-war Bosnia Roma have been one of the most mar-
ginalized and repressed social groups. According to the Roma NGOs, 75–100 thousand 
Roma are living in BiH and they are considered to be one of the largest national minori-
ties in the country. Although the country is on the way to the European Union there has 
been has been profound discrimination against Roma within the sector of employment, 
health, and political representation. For instance, Roma are the most numerous ethnic group 
amongst the homeless in BiH. More than 70 % of Roma do not have a house, while the 
rate of Roma returnees is very low (2009). According to a 2007 report by UNICEF, up to 
80% of Roma children in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not attend school, only 20% of Roma 
participate in secondary education, and less than 1% in higher education (2007). The pro-
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portion of Roma employed within the public sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina is estimated 
at 2–3%. Thus, they are discriminated against even in the terms of basic human rights.
In addition, even in the media the Roma members are degraded and describing them 
as “problematic”, “violent”, “dangerous” etc. For instance, when an incident involving the 
Roma happens, their full names are given in sensational headlines, even if they are minors, 
with almost an obligatory remark that they belong to the Roma minority (Turcilo 2009). In 
addition, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Thomas Hammar-
berg, and his delegation visited Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 27 to 30 November 2010 
in order to evaluate the living conditions of minority groups in BiH. As far as the Roma 
minority is concerned, the Delegation summarized that their lifestyle prevented the State 
from including them in statistics. The government knows they live in dif¿  cult situations 
and is serious about this issue. But the delegation said that the question was more one of 
prejudice than discrimination (Hammarberg 2011). Further, the Delegation recommends to 
the Bosnian government to intensify efforts in order to improve the social and economic 
conditions the Roma community drawing upon the Council of Europe Committee of Min-
isters’ Recommendation on the Policies for Roma and/or Travellers in Europe (CM 2008). 
9.  INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ETHNO-NATIONALIST ELITES 
In addition, the education system has been widely utilized by the ruling ethno-nation-
alists to strengthen their ethnic hegemony. In fact, ethnic leaders have not demonstrated 
necessary the political will and commitment to establish genuine multi-ethnic schools. As 
the European Commission pointed out in its 2009 Progress Report for BiH: “Divisions 
in the education system through continuous development of mono-ethnic schools in both 
entities are still a matter of concern and result in de facto segregation of pupils from the 
very beginning of their schooling” (European Commission 2009). Also, Curak argues that: 
Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina is our crucial failure. In the long run we are rearing the new 
children of future nationalism. I cannot believe that there is no civic outrage about this. We are liv-
ing in educational apartheid and we have become used to it. Education is the key evidence that the 
international community, together with local political entrepreneurs, is producing a virtual Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and a real Rhodesia. The people who produce ethnic segregation among children 
deserve nothing but absolute contempt. However, this kind of education is a mere reÀ  ection of this 
country’s construction. Should such a construction prevail in the near future we will continue to 
have children who would be incapable of any agreement and consensus (Curak 2005: 66). 
For instance, the educational system in the Federation of BiH is built on the model of 
“two schools under one roof” where children from two ethnic groups, Croats and Bosnians, 
attend classes in the same building, but are physically separated from each other and taught 
a separate curriculum. Today, there are 57 such schools in this part of Bosnia. Some ethnic 
politicians oppose integrated multi-ethnic schools free from political, religious and any other 
discrimination arguing they would lose their ethnic identity mixing with others. Ethno-nation-
alists have used education for the systematic indoctrination of their respective ethnic group. 
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What is more, the education system in BiH instead of playing a role of integrative 
platform in which democratic values and norms are being thought it has been under the 
vehement inÀ  uence of ethno-nationalist political elites resulting in serious discrimination 
of minority groups. On the other hand, the OECD stresses in its report published in Sep-
tember 2001 that “education systems should not just be ‘fair’ to minorities – they should 
promote a spirit of equality and tolerance among ethnic and cultural groups” (OECD 2007). 
However, in the post-Dayton Bosnia minorities have become “invisible” in the education 
system which is hammering out the ethno-nationalist paradigm. As Valery Perry argues: 
Let us take a look at language. The of¿  cial language in the Republika Srpska is Serbian, and in 
the Federation the of¿  cial languages are Bosnian or Croatian, depending on the canton. The ‘oth-
ers’ learn the language that is dominant in their particular surrounding. It is worth stressing that 
we have three of¿  cial languages in one country. ‘Others’ have been assimilated into an of¿  cial 
language, but only the language of their speci¿  c territory, which in my opinion is not in accordance 
with their human rights (Perry 2002: 27). 
10. IS A CONSOCIATIONLIST MODEL GOOD FOR BOSNIA? 
Probably the marginalization of minority groups from the Dayton negotiations and 
from the agreed accord conception was a result of a speedy reaction to end the war and 
¿  nd a dif¿  cult compromise solution. The most important thing was to end the horrible war 
and ¿  nd a power-sharing model in which each ethnic group will take part without being 
discriminated and dominated by the other two groups, respectively. That is, the main objec-
tive of the Dayton negotiations was peace rather than equality, thus discriminating against 
non-nationalist groups. As the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concluded in 
their ruling concerning the Sejdic-Finci case: 
(...) a very fragile cease-¿  re was in effect on the ground. The provisions were designed to end 
a brutal conÀ  ict marked by genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’. The nature of the conÀ  ict was such 
that the approval of the ‘constituent peoples’ (...) was necessary to ensure peace. This could ex-
plain, without necessarily justifying, the absence of representatives of other communities … at 
the peace negotiations and the participants’ preoccupation with effective equality between the 
‘constituent peoples’ in the post-conÀ  ict society (ECHR 2009: 34).
As a result, BiH has become a bi-cameral legislature where the three so-called “con-
stituent peoples”, Bosnians, Serbs and Croats, are represented in parity (5:5:5) in the second 
chamber, the House of Peoples (Marko 2005: 6). In addition, both the state presidency and 
the national government with ministers and their deputies are composed according to the 
ethnic power-sharing. Thus, the post-Dayton institutional framework is to a large extent 
based on the consociationalist model of power-sharing (Lipjhart 1994). Consociational-
ism is a form of power-sharing whose main purpose is the reconciliation of diverse social 
preferences along ethnic and religious lines (Schneckener 2002: 203–206). In other words, 
the Dayton Agreement has resulted in an institutional framework in which the largest three 
ethnic groups are of¿  cially recognized in the constitution and which take equal part at all 
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administrative decision-making levels, and also enjoying the same right of veto when their 
respective “vital national rights” are endangered (Bieber 2004). However, the consocia-
tionalist model of power-sharing in Bosnia has not brought about the necessary democratic 
transformation and reconciliation even after the ¿  fteen years of transition period. While 
envisaged to keep the equilibrium between three ethnic groups the Dayton-based conso-
ciationalist model completely excluded minority members and non-nationalists from the 
decision-making process. 
11. THE PRIMACY OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
The post-war power-sharing order in Bosnia and Herzegovina has heavily relied on the 
constituent ethnic groups. However, the weak performance of democracy and ethnic toler-
ance under the current rules reveals the limits of institutional engineering (Manning, Antiü 
2003, 55–56). It is of crucial importance to apply institutional engineering in post-conÀ  ict 
societies in order to bring peace and stability among warring fractions. In fact, institution-
al engineering is the art of providing for rules and institutions in order to pursue political 
goals – such as creating a functioning multi-ethnic democracy (Reilly 2001; Grofman, Stock-
well 2003). Nevertheless, the war in Bosnia was thought to end through the ethnic balance 
of power-sharing which resulted in a political concept that was counterproductive further 
increasing ethnic tensions among the warring groups. As Zarije Seizovic points out:
The “ethnic criteria” introduced in the Preamble of the Constitution of BiH (being reinforced 
in a number of places in its normative part) prevents the BiH authorities from sharing power 
equally within civil society, favouring ethnic groups to the detriment of the individual citizen 
(Seizovic 2007: 2). 
In fact, such a power-sharing model has been viewed in essentialist and absolutist terms 
by ethnic groups or a clear example of the zero-sum game. 
Furthermore, while minority groups were completely marginalized during the nego-
tiations among the warring ethnic groups their presence and political inclusion could be 
utilized for the development of a democratic and open system of governance. While today 
after the ruling of the ECHR they have become a huge problem on the country’s integration 
into Euro-Atlantic associations they could actually be a part of a long-term solution. In fact, 
the Constitution of BiH recognizes basic human rights and the protection of minority groups 
and requires that State institutions and both Entity government tenure the highest level 
of internationally recognized human rights and freedom from discrimination (Art. II 4). 
Yet, in practice all the country’s citizens do not enjoy human rights and fundamental free-
doms on an equal basis. That is, the current constitutional order was unsuccessful from the 
very outset in BiH, as it has not provided for the protection of individual citizens but their 
collective identity (Seizovic 2007: 2). Were the minority protected from the discriminatory 
acts the whole concept would turn from ethnic to civic eradicating the ethnic homogeni-
zation as a main source of political and social tensions in Bosnia. This would lead to the 
strengthening of universal human rights as prescribed by the liberal-democratic order.
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12. NO COMMON BOSNIAN CITIZENSHIP
Following the ethnic conÀ  ict in 1992–1995 and the post-war domination of the ethno-na-
tionalist paradigm citizenship in Bosnia has acquired unique features based extensively on the 
primacy of group rights over individual rights. In fact, the Dayton constitutional framework 
guarantees both state and entity citizenship for the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That 
is, the acquisition of entity citizenship has further intensi¿  ed the process of ethnic homogeni-
zation and also the exclusion of non-ethnic elements in the country. As Sarajlic points out: 
In addition to the malaise of postsocialist transition, shared by all the Yugoslavian successor states, 
the existing Bosnian citizenship regime has been strongly inÀ  uenced by a heritage of ethnic con-
À  ict and the provisional constitutional set-up of the country, (...) the conceptualization of citizen-
ship in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been dependent on the de¿  nition of the community of citizens 
who constitute the state. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a nation-state (and has never been 
one) but a federal union based on the sovereignty of ethnic groups which have political supremacy 
over individuals, making clear-cut assumptions and de¿  nitions of Bosnian citizenship is close to 
impossible (Sarajlic 2010: 2). 
That is why, it has become almost illogical to talk about the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina since more than half of the country’s population does feel as Serbs, Croats, 
or Bosnians rather than Bosnians. In other words, BiH political discourse has become lim-
ited and even restrictive for the members perceiving themselves as Yugoslavs, Bosnians, 
Romas, Jews, and so forth. In that regard, Atajic points out that, 
(...) everything – from the greeting you use to the dialect you speak and the newspaper in your 
coat pocket – is judged, commented upon and categorized in terms of an omnipresent, mysticised 
‘ethnicity’. Under such circumstances, de¿  ning oneself as a citizen of the BiH state is tantamount 
to a betrayal of one’s national identity (Atajic 2002: 118).
In fact, for the vast majority of people in Bosnia ethnicity is perceived as a religious 
dogma that has to be respected. Such a situation has produced negative consequences on 
the development of common Bosnian citizenship. In this context, there is also a kind of 
absurdity; namely, even those citizens who are Bosnians (instead of being Serbs, Bosnians 
or Croats) constitute a minority in BiH (Turcilo 2009: 1).
13. “CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NATIONALITIES”
Furthermore, the interests of collectivity have dominated individual preferences of citi-
zens preventing the development of free discussion and inclusion of non-ethnic elements 
of society. As Mujkiü and Husley point out: 
Since the ¿  rst democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991, politics has been charac-
terized by ethnopolitics rather than interest-based politics. The result is that political competition 
for voters has been warped, with the role of voters reduced to a kind of ethnic census (Mujkiü, 
Husley 2010: 144).
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What is more, before the day of elections the vast majority of the members of three 
ethnic groups decide “collectively” to give vote to their ethno-nationalist political parties, 
respectively. In other words, the post-war ethno-nationalization discourse has created om-
nipresent “ethno-nationalist pressure” over the members of Bosnian society to identify with 
one of the three national groups. That is, the post-war ethno-nationalist paradigm “natu-
rally” exerts pressure on Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Catholics, and Bosnian Orthodox, to 
align with their respective nationalist political parties. What is more, 
(...) the corrupt and criminal nationalist political elites homogenize ‘their’ peoples in a coordinated 
manner by various repressive, psychological, and propagandist methods, presenting themselves 
as naturally predetermined missionaries with the ‘historical’ task of protecting national interests 
of their peoples (Sadikovic 2005: 30). 
In terms of institutional ethno-nationalization, the Bosnian system suffers from in-
stitutional blockades that emerge because politicians elected separately by each ethnic 
community do not manage to agree on compromises that can withstand the manifold veto 
powers. The exclusionary Bosnian institutional structure under Dayton has allowed the 
representative of each of the three ethnic groups to enjoy veto power over any proposed 
legislation and it created a tripartite state presidency consisting of each group and em-
powered each member with a veto over any legislation. While “veto power” of the ethnic 
representatives is their guarantee mechanism that they will be equally included in the 
decision-making process it clearly discriminates against civic interests. As Lyon claims, 
“the concept of “constitutionality of nationalities” permits legalized discrimination on 
the basis of ethnic background, and prima facie contradicts principles of the Council of 
Europe. Indeed, the entire constitution enshrines ethnic discrimination as a principle of 
law” (Lyon 2006: 52). Thus, each and every civic initiative is discredited by the highly 
institutionalized ethno-nationalist discourse.
14. WHY VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST? 
The tendency of an extensive institutionalization of ethno-nationalist politics in the 
post-Dayton Bosnia has been realized through structural framework where ethnic rights 
are safeguarded on the basis of the so-called “vital national interest” (VNI). That is, in the 
House of Peoples of BiH the representatives of each constituent nation have a right to block 
law if it is against the VNI of their nation, respectively. In a similar fashion, the tripartite 
state presidency has the power of veto on legislative decisions if they believe they represent 
a threat for the vital interests of their nations. However, the notion of the VNI in the Bos-
nian case it employs a rather vague sense of  “national”. “National” is usually interpreted 
simply as “ethnic” (Mujkiü 2007). Therefore, at the heart of the notion of VNI clearly 
lies the ethnic dimension of political representation rather than a kind of state or national 
interest. That’s why, the principle of VNI is highly discriminatory against minority groups 
and non-nationalists since they do not have a right to use veto in state and entity level. 
Simply put, widespread politicization of ethnicity and the success of ethnically-oriented 
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political parties are serious obstacles in front of the long-term democratization process 
(Chandler 2000: 111).
The main idea behind the vital national interest was to provide a sophisticated system 
of checks and balances to guarantee the rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s “constituent 
peoples”, i.e. Bosnians, Croats and Serbs. State and Entity constitutions establish block-
ing mechanisms protecting the “vital interests” of these constituent peoples (EC 2005: 9). 
However, while VNI completely marginalizes each member of the society not declaring 
as nationalist it is further slowing down legislative process on the country’s road to Euro-
-Atlantic integration. This power-sharing provision based on the concept of VNI has im-
paired the quality of Bosnian democracy where citizens are represented only as members 
of one of the three constituent peoples, placing ethnic representation before general interest 
and making “nations rather than citizens the bearers of all rights” (Katana, Igric: 2005). As 
stated in the report of the USAID: 
Bosnia’s constitution enshrines the “vital national interests” of the constituent peoples and in 
doing so guarantees both political inclusion and exclusion by ethnicity... Bosnians ¿  lter public 
discourse by ethnicity, including as valid their group’s views, excluding as invalid the views of 
other groups. The public square is available to all – one opinion, one voice and one group at a time 
(USAID 2007: 6).
As Eriksen points out, “whether or not ethnic identities become politically relevant 
depends on the wider social context” (Eriksen 1993: 158). 
15. BOSNIA: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY OR ETHNOCRACY? 
In addition, the post-war Bosnian political system does not contain democratic values 
such as equality and freedom and it does not ensure that all its citizens feel equal before 
the law and have equal access to the legislative process. As Bojkov stresses democracy 
in the post-war Bosnia cannot be said to be constitutionally framed (Bojkov 2003: 60). 
Democracy is a form of government in which all citizens can participate on an equal 
basis in the decision-making process that affects their lives. What is more, John Dewey 
once pointed out that: “The cause of democracy is the moral cause of dignity and the 
worth of the individual” (Dewey 1980: 7). The term democracy was invented in ancient 
Greece in the middle of the 4th century BC to de¿  ne the political order in some Greek city-
-states, and meaning “rule of people” coined from demos meaning people and kratos which 
means power. 
In terms of ontology of power, in the post-Dayton Bosnia political power has been in 
the hands of ethnic oligarchies and ethnic communities as a group rather than in the hands 
of individual citizens. In other words, the ethnically-centered Dayton Agreement has be-
come the main obstacle to the establishment of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and at the same time serves as a means for “ethnically disciplining the citizen of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (Sarcevic 1997: 40). Thus, the Bosnian social context has been dominated 
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by the idea of Volksgemeinshaft or the people’s community rather than community of free 
individuals. In this manner, Živanoviü highlights the post-war political constellations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as following: “Here, we do not live as human beings but as Serbs, 
Croats and Bosniacs” (Živanoviü 2005). In fact, the post-Dayton regime has dehumanized 
public space in Bosnia. 
Thus, todays Bosnia resembles rather a kind of “illiberal democracy” as Fareed Za-
karia explains the phenomena of promotion of free elections around the world without the 
provision of basic human rights and freedoms (Zakaria 1997). Thus, the post-war Bosnian 
political regime is a kind of ethnocracy rather than representing democratic system. An 
ethnocracy is a regime that facilitates “the expansion, ethnicization and control of contested 
territory and state by a dominant ethnic nation” (Yiftachel, Ghanem 2004: 649). In fact, 
extreme prioritization of ethnic values over individual principles has made it threatening 
to democracy. As Mujkiü points out: 
I call a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic group(s) over the individual 
that is implemented through democratic self-legislation, and a community characterized by the 
political priority of the ethnic group’s right to self-determination over the citizen’s right to self-
determination where the citizen’s membership in a political community is determined by her or 
his membership in ethnic community, Ethnopolis. And I call the political narrative and practice 
intended to justify this ethnically-based social construct, ethnopolitics (Mujkiü 2007: 116). 
Similarly, Roger Friedland de¿  nes this phenomenon as a religious nationalism claim-
ing that:
Ethnopolitics puts forward a particular ontology of power, an ontology revealed and af¿  rmed 
through its politicized practices and the central object of its political concern, practices that locate 
collective solidarity in ethnic af¿  liation tied to particular religions, as opposed to contractual and 
consensual relations between individual citizens (Friedland 2001: 126). 
16. COLLECTIVE EQUALITY OF ETHNIC GROUPS 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
What is more, the Dayton-based constitutional framework is in contradiction to Euro-
pean Union values of fundamental and human rights. Simply put, the Dayton Agreement 
ensures the protection of collective rights of ethnic groups while the rights of minority 
groups have not been included into the legal framework. In other words, a leading Catholic 
scholar in Bosnia and Herzegovina Mile Babic, points out that: 
Collectivism is the biggest wound, the very cancer to the state and society of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. No one has the right on this Earth to reduce a living individual, free person, unique human 
being to mere member of national collective or to a mere member of a religious collective or any 
other collective. Collectivism is the negation of the freedom of individual man, the negation of 
true religion, politics and morality (Babic 2005: 172). 
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In this regard, in March 2005 the Venice Commission proposed the range of the con-
stitutional reforms that are necessary to prepare Bosnia and Herzegovina for the future EU 
membership. The main recommendations that the Venice Commission made are: 
í transfer of competencies from the entities to the state,
í reform of inef¿  cient state legislative and executive structures,
í elimination of “prerogatives for ethnic or group rights”,
í strengthening citizens’ rights,
í clari¿  cation of the entities’ future relationship to the state (Joseph, Hitchner 2008: 5). 
The Venice Commission also summarizes that Bosnian integration into the EU is under 
threat since its institutional framework is in direct breach of ECHR stated rules highlighting 
“the existence of tensions between a constitutional system based on the collective equal-
ity of ethnic groups on the one hand, and the principle of individual rights and equality of 
citizens on the other.” (Venice Commission 2005: 17). 
Also, persons not belonging to the three biggest national groups may align with one 
of the three nationalist political af¿  liations respectively in order to feel on equal basis with 
members of the three ethnic groups. For instance, there have been high-positioned of¿  cials 
at state government that have preferred one of the ethnic political parties in order to “exer-
cise their citizenship rights”. However, this is not a long-term solution that can guarantee 
the equality of citizens in a country. In this regard, the Venice Commission highlights that: 
First of all, the interests of persons not belonging to the three constituent peoples risk being ne-
glected or people are forced to arti¿  cially identify with one of the three peoples although they may, 
for example, be of mixed origin or belong to a different category. Each individual is free to change 
his political party af¿  liation. By contrast, ethnic identity is far more permanent, and individuals will 
not be willing to vote for parties perceived as representing the interest of a different ethnic group, 
even if these parties provide better and more ef¿  cient government. A system favoring and enshrin-
ing a party system based on ethnicity therefore seems À  awed (Venice Commission 2005: 12).
17. CONCLUSION
Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the transitioning countries of the former communist 
Yugoslavia which has started widespread democratic transformation and the building of 
an open society in the aftermath of the turbulent disintegration of the federal country in 
the late 1980s. While democratic transition in the country was expected to bring about 
wide participation of diverse societal groups into policy-making the post-war Bosnian 
public sphere has been increasingly dominated by ethno-nationalists causing omnipresent 
discrimination against minority groups and those that declare as non-nationalists. That is, 
democracy brought about a collectivist doctrine rather than the promotion of individual 
rights. In addition, in spite of the fact that BiH is going through a deep Europeanization 
process in which the country’s political, economic, and administrative system are supposed 
to transform into stable, functional and democratic structures signi¿  cant number of Bosnian 
citizens are still widely marginalized and excluded from the decision-making processes. 
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Although the Copenhagen political criteria require applicant countries to achieve “stabil-
ity of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities” BiH is even today facing a serious democratic de¿  cit, and 
especially with regards to widespread discrimination against members of the Bosnian com-
munity who do not feel as ethnic-nationalists.
Thus, in post-Dayton Bosnia the public sphere has become secured only for members 
of the three largest ethnic groups constitutionally recognized as the so-called constituent 
nations. As Jurgen Habermas argues, the public space has been built on the extreme mar-
ginalization of citizens as the holders of power whose status as members of a political com-
munity has been restricted. In fact, democratic participation in the country’s public space 
has turned into a competition between ethnicities or ethnic communities rather than a race 
of equal individuals having the right to vote. The question of ethnicity has become a raison 
d’être for the three ethnic groups since they believe that their physical survival depends 
on the permanent struggle for ethnic identity. Such a political model is a kind of ethno-de-
mocracy or ethnocracy which vehemently violates human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and thus slows down the country’s progress towards EU membership. That is, BiH cannot 
enter the EU while its public sphere is extremely dominated by ethno-nationalist elites that 
prevent the development of an open, democratic, and inclusive society. I think that only 
a liberal-democratic model of political organization can resolve the Bosnian political and 
social deadlock. As Gutmann argues: 
Basic human rights are instruments to protect and respect individuals as creative subjects or agents. 
Democratic states, therefore, should give priority to basic rights over the claims of cultural groups 
that are incompatible with those rights, whether the group is called a nation, a culture, or the state 
itself (Gutmann 2003: 79). 
In this regard, systemic inclusion of the minority members and non-nationalists into the 
policy-making process can turn from being a problem into being a part of solution for the 
country’s long-standing political impasse. 
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ETNONACJONALISTYCZNY ĝWIATOPOGLĄD W BOĝNI I HERCEGOWINIE 
JAKO PRZESZKODA NA DRODZE DO UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ
Pomimo faktu, Īe BoĞnia i Hercegowina od koĔca lat 90. przechodzą proces europeizacji, kraj ten nadal nie 
osiągnąá spodziewanego poziomu demokratycznego. Szczególną uwagĊ naleĪy zwróciü na rosnącą polityczną 
dominacjĊ etniczno-nacjonalistycznych siá politycznych w powojennej BoĞni. Mają one tendencjĊ do insty-
tucjonalnej marginalizacji obywateli grup mniejszoĞciowych i tych, którzy deklarują siĊ jako nienacjonaliĞci. 
Takie dyskryminacyjne procesy stoją w sprzecznoĞci z aspiracjami tego kraju do czáonkostwa w Unii Euro-
pejskiej. Tak wiĊc artykuá przedstawia proces rozwoju powojennego etnonacjonalistycznego paradygmatu, 
który zaowocowaá dyskryminacją „innych”. W konkluzjach wskazano, Īe powojenną demokracjĊ BoĞni cha-
rakteryzują powaĪne braki instytucjonalne. Skutkują one powstaniem etnokratycznego reĪimu wykluczającego 
wszystkich, którzy nie czują siĊ czĊĞcią takiego systemu. Tak wiĊc obecny proces etnonacjonalizacji blokuje 
wejĞcie BoĞni do Unii Europejskiej.
Sáowa kluczowe: demokracja, ukáad z Dayton, etnonacjonalizm, Unia Europejska, grupy mniejszoĞciowe, 
narody skáadowe
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